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Abstract 
Since its conquest by Britain in 1890, Zimbabwe has witnessed a series of constitution 
making projects. Spanning over 100 years, the question of constitutional development has 
continued to dominate public debate. The end of colonial rule did not see an end to the 
demand for a constitution that is legitimate and durable. The search for an enduring and good 
constitution continued into the 21st century. With the unveiling of the 2013 constitution-
making project, however, it seemed as if a long lasting solution had been ‘delivered’ on the 
question of a legitimate and durable constitution. 
The thesis assesses the questions of institutions and processes in Zimbabwe’s quest to 
construct a new constitution. It contends that institutions and processes used to make 
constitutions are as important as the contents of a final constitution. That is why more time 
and efforts are often spent negotiating the twin questions of institutions and processes of 
constitution-making than is spent negotiating the content of a constitution. With this in mind, 
the thesis develops standards for assessing institutions and processes used in successive 
constitution-making projects in Zimbabwe.  
A major finding of the assessment is that the twin questions of institutions and processes 
were neglected in all constitution-making efforts undertaken in Zimbabwe, including that 
which culminated in the creation of the Constitution of 2013. The thesis maintains that a lot 
of significance must be attached to the design of institutions and processes of constitution-
making if a constitution is to be enduring and widely accepted as legitimate. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
1. Background to the study 
In 2013, Zimbabwe adopted a new constitution. The adoption of the 2013 constitution came 
on the back of a series of constitution-making projects that sought to provide this land-locked 
southern African country with a legitimate and durable constitution. Between 1889 and 2007, 
the country experienced twelve constitution-making exercises. Although the majority of these 
efforts saw the construction of complete documents in the form of new constitutions, the 
legitimacy of these documents was always contested. As a result, the country continued with 
its search for a durable constitution. In fact, the search for an acceptable constitution has 
arguably been the country’s biggest headache since 1890 when it was placed under British 
protection as a semi-autonomous colony.  
Southern Rhodesia, as today’s Zimbabwe was known then, was granted the Royal Charter, 
the first document that resembled a constitution, in 1889. Thirty-four years later, the Royal 
Charter was replaced by the 1923 Constitution. The decision to form a political union with its 
two neighbours, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, led to the adoption of a federal 
constitution in 1953. The political union was short lived. The collapse of the political union 
was followed by the adoption of the 1961 Constitution. The decision of the colony to 
unilaterally declare independence from Britain prompted the replacement of the 1961 
Constitution with yet another new constitution in 1965.  
By 1979, it had become clear that a new constitutional order would have to be adopted to 
give effect to the aspirations of the majority. The constitutional dispensation that was in place 
at the time was perpetuating social injustice and the marginalisation of the black majority.1  
However, efforts to overhaul the constitution could not be realised as the liberation struggle 
failed to deliver a conclusive settlement of the war effort. Faced with a stalemate and a 
protracted war with no end in sight, the war weary leaders, on both sides of the divide, agreed 
to negotiate a new constitution. The negotiated settlement, mediated by the colonial power, 
Britain, resulted in the 1980 constitution, which is commonly referred to as the Lancaster 
House Constitution. That, however, did not resolve the search for a legitimate and durable 
constitution. Other constitution-making projects followed soon.  
                                                          
1 Hatchard 2001: 212. 
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The next major attempt at creating a legitimate and durable constitution came in 2000 when a 
government backed Constitutional Commission created a draft constitution, which was, 
however, rejected in a referendum.2 The following year, civil society organisations, under the 
aegis of the National Constitutional Assembly, created a constitution which was ignored by 
government.3 Six years later, three major political parties that were locked in a bitter tussle 
for power, namely the Zimbabwe African National Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF) and the 
two Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) formations, secretly negotiated a document 
commonly known as the Kariba draft constitution. Civil society groups successfully 
mobilised public opinion against the adoption of the constitution.4  
It was against this background that Zimbabwe went to the polls on 28 March 2008 to vote in 
the general election covering local government, parliamentary and presidential elections. 
When the Zimbabwe Election Commission began to announce election results, it became 
clear that the opposition MDC, led by Morgan Tsvangirai, had defeated the ruling party, 
ZANU PF at the poll.  It won most of the local government and parliamentary seats. With the 
presidential election pointing to victory for Tsvangirai, the electoral authorities postponed the 
announcement of the result for more than one month. When the result was finally announced, 
it showed that Tsvangirai had obtained the largest vote, which was, however, slightly short of 
the majority vote required to win the election.5 The inconclusive result necessitated a run-off 
election. 
Tsvangirai withdrew from the runoff election citing the harassment and intimidation of his 
supporters. Despite his withdrawal, Robert Mugabe entered the presidential race alone and 
was declared the winner. The presidential election result was nullified by the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). With the concurrence of the African Union, the 
SADC tasked Thabo Mbeki, former President of South Africa, to mediate the crisis by 
facilitating the formation of a Government of National Unity. On 15 September 2008, the 
protagonists signed the Global Political Agreement (GPA), a document that, among other 
                                                          
2 Dorman 2003: 851.  
3 This is not a government body. 
4 Hatchard 2001: 213. 
5 Feldman 2013: 2. Tsvangirai secured 48 per cent of the vote instead of the 50+1 one threshold provided for in 
the Constitution to avoid a run-off election. 
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things, mandated the creation of a new constitution. It was this agreement that eventually led 
to the adoption of the 2013 constitution. 
2. Statement of the problem 
From the quick survey of Zimbabwe’s constitutional history, it is clear that the country has 
failed to produce a legitimate and durable constitution. The study explores this persistent 
failure of the authorities of the Zimbabwe government to come up with a good and enduring 
constitution. It does so by focusing on the institutions and processes of constitution-making 
that led to the creation of Zimbabwe’s many, but often short-lived, constitutions. It, in 
particular, assesses the extent to which the institutions and processes of constitution making 
met the demands of participatory, inclusive and transparent constitution-making. In order to 
achieve these objectives, the following questions are asked:   
● What are the issues that one must consider when creating participatory, inclusive and 
transparent constitution-making institutions?  
● What are the issues that one must consider when designing participatory, inclusive 
and transparent constitution-making processes? 
● Did the institutions and processes that led to the creation of the successive 
constitutions, including the current Constitution, meet the demands of participatory, 
inclusive and transparent constitution making?  
3. Objectives of the study 
The objectives of this study are twofold. The first objective of the thesis is to illustrate that 
the institutions and processes of constitution-making are key considerations in deciding 
whether a new constitution is successfully created. The second objective is to demonstrate 
that the failure to create an acceptable constitution in Zimbabwe is partly associated with the 
failure to place a premium on the institutions and processes of constitution-making. 
4. Limitations of the study 
The study uses the desk research methodology and follows a purely procedural approach. It 
seeks to identify issues relating to institutions and processes of constitution-making that a 
country must consider when creating a constitution. The same issues are then discussed in the 
context of assessing the institutions and processes of constitution making in Zimbabwe.  
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It must be made clear from the outset that this thesis is not based on the premise that 
institutions and processes are the only factors that matter in creating a legitimate and durable 
constitution. The content of a constitution also matters. The content, after all, articulates the 
visions and aspirations of the society, the kind of society it seeks to create. It also sets out the 
common values that define the political community. It is furthermore in the content of the 
constitution that one finds the ways in which state power is to be exercised as well as the Bill 
of Rights that allows individuals to limit the exercise of power by government.  
A constitution that has an excellent and progressive content and one that is an outcome of 
institutions and processes that were inclusive, participatory and transparent may nevertheless 
not become a living document that commands respect and enjoys longevity.6  ‘Old vested 
interests, armed with money and other resources, may capture new institutions and neutralize 
the progressive agenda of the constitution.’7 Alternatively, ‘[p]owerful foreign actors who 
may have pushed for a democracy are likely to find that their own economic and geopolitical 
interests are incompatible with genuine local democracy and seek to limit public 
participation’.8 A constitution that is created using inclusive, participatory and transparent 
institutions and processes could be ignored or may not take root. What is equally important is 
thus what happens in the days after the constitution is enacted. In this regard, the continuous 
engagement of civil society with the constitution, and more importantly, an active civil 
society that monitors governance are crucial in ensuring that a constitution becomes ‘a living 
reality’. 9 
                                                          
6 In Eritrea, a constitution that passed through institutions and processes that were inclusive, participatory and 
transparent was not signed into law as the State president feared to lose his monopoly on power. On the other 
hand, the constitutions of Japan, Germany and Eastern Europe have withstood the test of time although these 
documents were either imposed by foreign powers or were the result of roundtables dominated by the elite in 
society. See Mataza 2012:1; Elster 1995:369. 
7 Ghai & Galli 2006a: 238. 
8 Ghai & Galli 2006b: 238. 
9 In South Africa, for example, civil society organisations have been involved in public interest litigation and 
advocacy. One such case is The Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) case involving citizens’ right to access anti-
retroviral drugs upon testing positive for HIV. In Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign 
and Others (No 2) (CCT8/02) [2002] ZACC 15; 2002 (5) SA 721; 2002 (10) BCLR 1033 (5 July 2002), the 
TAC sued the South African government for not ensuring that mother-to-child-transmission (MTCT) prevention 
was available to all pregnant mothers. Although the government devised a programme to deal with mother to 
child transmission of HIV at birth and identified nevirapine as its drug of choice for the purpose, the programme 
imposed restrictions on the availability of nevirapine in the public health sector. Sections 27 and 28 of the 
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In short, this study is not based on the understanding that inclusive, transparent and 
participatory institutions and processes of constitution- making are the sine qua non for the 
creation of a durable and legitimate constitution. They form but one crucial part of the jigsaw 
puzzle that must be completed to have a sustainable constitution that contributes toward the 
consolidation of democracy and the culture of human rights. It is with this in mind that the 
thesis discusses how the different choices of institutions of constitution-making and the 
different stages of the process can be used to give effect to the constitutional principles of 
inclusion, participation and transparency. 
5. Significance of the study 
The attention given thus far to issues of institutions and processes of constitution-making has 
been scant. This is particularly the case in Zimbabwe. The thesis provides a comprehensive 
analysis of the institutions and processes that led to the creation of the 2013 Constitution. It, 
in particular, seeks to answer the extent to which the institutions and processes of 
constitution-making were based on the norms of participatory, inclusive and transparent 
constitution-making. By doing so, the thesis seeks to break new ground by focusing on issues 
of institutions and processes that have not always received prominence whenever an account 
of the history of constitutional development in Zimbabwe is told. It emphasises that 
institutions and processes of constitution-making are as important as the content of a 
constitution.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Constitution, the TAC contended, oblige the government to implement a comprehensive programme for the 
prevention of MTCT throughout South Africa. The TAC won the case, forcing the reluctant government of 
former South African President Thabo Mbeki to roll out a comprehensive anti-retroviral access drugs 
programme across the country through its health clinics. In Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), the Cape Town’s Walladene Informal Settlement, 
represented by Irene Grootboom, a housing rights activist applied to the Cape of the Good Hope Court (the High 
Court) for an order requiring government to provide them with adequate basic shelter or housing until they 
obtained permanent accommodation and were granted relief. The respondents, assisted by the Human Rights 
Commission and the Community Law Centre of the University of the Western Cape, argued that the 
Constitution provides everyone the right to adequate housing and imposes an obligation upon the State to take 
reasonable legislative powers and other measures to ensure the progressive realisation of this right within its 
available resources. The court found that the government had not met its obligations to provide adequate 
housing for the residents of the informal settlement. The ruling did not only keep the Constitution alive, it 
provided a clear legal support for housing rights campaigns in South Africa and elsewhere. See also Arato 2000: 
35. 
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6. Literature review 
Very few writers have directed their efforts to analyse the constitution- making project that 
ended recently in Zimbabwe. Even fewer have written on the legitimacy of the constitution-
making process in providing a platform for capturing the aspirations of Zimbabweans. Most 
of the views on the constitution-making process in Zimbabwe take the form of newspaper 
articles trying to capture the constitutional process as it unfolded on an intermittent basis. 
Occasionally, one comes across articles in journals and on the web trying to analyse the 
making of the 2013 constitution.  
In ‘Fundamentals of constitution making in Zimbabwe: A case for Zimbabwe’, Chigwangwa 
examines some of the reasons why previous processes of constitution-making failed to 
deliver a widely acceptable constitution. Some of the reasons given by the author include the 
effects of political intimidation as well as interference and mistrust between government and 
citizens. The author concludes by making the observation that the history of constitution-
making in Zimbabwe has witnessed self-evident tension between the need to reach a broad-
based consensus on the process of constitution-making, on the one hand, and the need to 
ensure that the authority of the government is not undermined, on the other.10  
In an article titled ‘Zimbabwe’s constitutional reform process: Challenges and prospects’, 
Dzinesa discusses efforts at constitution-making in the period between 1999 and 2007.11  The 
author traces the efforts at constitution-making to the objectionable piecemeal amendments of 
the Lancaster House Constitution. Thereafter, the author argues that constitution-making 
under the auspices of the Constitutional Commission was ‘inherently flawed in that it was 
specifically designed to ensure presidential control’.12 The author praises the constitution-
making of the National Constitutional Assembly (NCA) for ‘carrying out a people driven 
constitutional reform process’.13 Although the draft it produced was ignored, the NCA 
managed to keep constitutional issues on the national agenda. Turning to the 2007 
constitution-making effort, the author criticises ZANU PF and the MDC formations for 
restricting the constitutional reform process to a select team of partisan representatives.  The 
                                                          
10 Chigwangwa 2009: 2. 
11 Dzinesa 2012a: 5. 
12 Dzinesa 2012b: 4.  
13 Dzinesa 2013: 4. 
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author concludes on a rather sad note by observing that the process of constitution-making 
has always occurred in fits and starts and that it has largely been intermittent in character. 
In an article titled ‘Some lessons on constitution-making from Zimbabwe’, Hatchard 
discusses constitution-making under the 2000 Constitutional Commission. The author notes a 
number of shortcomings in the manner in which the draft constitution was produced. These 
include a poorly structured consultation process, manipulation of the work of the 
Constitutional Commission by the State President, the domination of the constitution-making 
body by the State President and the unfettered discretion enjoyed by the State President in 
deciding the fate of the draft. These shortcomings prompt Hatchard to conclude that unless a 
constitution-making body is ‘demonstrably independent, its membership fully representative 
of civil society and its deliberations transparent, the drafting process is susceptible to 
manipulation’.14  
In an article titled ‘Zimbabwe’s constitution-making and electoral reform processes: 
Opportunities and challenges’, Sachikonye explains why constitution making has been a 
chequered process. The author cites the ‘country’s history of militarisation, authoritarianism, 
elite intransigence, and lack of a national consensus over a social contract and reform 
framework’15 as the main reasons why the country continues to be locked in a never ending 
search for a durable constitution. Constitution-making cannot succeed, the author argues, as 
the elite have tended to regard constitutions as major instruments for ‘access to power or 
sharing of power’.16  
In an article titled ‘Designing constitution-making processes: Lessons from the past, 
questions for the future’, Miller discusses a number of issues relating to constitution-making 
in Zimbabwe.17  These include participation, state-society engagement, consultation, 
endorsement and ratification. The author concludes that government control of constitution-
making is the reason the country continues to grapple with the creation of a durable 
constitution. The effort to control the processes comes against the backdrop of vigorous 
resistance by civil society organisations seeking to limit the role of the government in 
constitution-making. Many argue that government’s failure to limit its role in constitution-
                                                          
14 Hatchard 2001: 212. 
15 Sachikonye 2011: 2. 
16 Sachikonye 2011: 19. 
17 Miller E.L, 2010: 620. 
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making is one of the reasons that led to the rejection of the 2000 draft constitution in a 
referendum.18  
From the foregoing, it is clear that there has not been a study that examined the successive 
constitution-making efforts in a comprehensive manner. Further, the institutions and 
processes that were used to create the successive constitutions have not been given specific 
attention. The thesis intends to change that. It will do so by providing the first comprehensive 
examination of the constitution-making bodies and the procedures that were used to create 
the successive constitutions of Zimbabwe. Particular attention is to be given to the making of 
the current Constitution. In short, the thesis provides a comprehensive historical and 
contemporary discussion of the constitution-making projects that Zimbabwe has seen in the 
last one hundred and twenty four years.       
7. Structure of the study 
The study is organised into six Chapters. Chapter Two provides a background to the history 
of constitution-making in Zimbabwe. It focuses on the institutions and processes that were 
used in successive constitution-making efforts in Zimbabwe between 1889 and 1980. The 
first period, which runs from 1889 to 1961, focuses on the history of constitution-making 
under colonial rule. The second period, which runs from 1965 to 1980, focuses on the history 
of constitution-making under white nationalist rule. By providing a historical background, the 
thesis aims to achieve two goals. First, it provides the context within which to evaluate the 
latest efforts at constitution-making, particularly the 2013 Constitution. Second, it also 
highlights the shortcomings that characterised the earliest constitution-making projects that, 
apparently, were not confined to Zimbabwe and have given rise to the emerging consensus 
that constitution-making must be guided by a set of constitutional principles, which are the 
focus of Chapter Three.  
In Chapter Three, the thesis takes a detour from the discussion on the history of constitution-
making in Zimbabwe to take stock of the constitutional principles that were emerging as 
Zimbabwe was moving away from a century of colonial and white rule. These are principles 
that are designed to guide the making of a constitution. The chapter begins the discussion by 
outlining the principles. After outlining the constitutional principles, the Chapter focuses on 
the different choices of institutions for constitution-making and examines how these 
                                                          
18 Miller E.L, 2010: 620.  
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institutions can give effect to the principles. This is followed by a discussion of the general 
features of a typical process of constitution-making. The purpose of the Chapter is to identify 
‘process related issues’ that must be taken into account in assessing a constitution-making 
project.  
Having reviewed the principles that a constitution-making project must comply with, the 
thesis returns, in Chapter Four, to the history of constitution-making in Zimbabwe. This time, 
the focus is on the institutions and processes of constitution-making that were used in the 
period between 2000 and 2007. Relying on the standards identified in the preceding Chapter, 
Chapter Four assesses the institutions and processes used in the creation of successive (draft) 
constitutions.  
Chapter Five focuses on the institutions and processes leading to the creation of the 2013 
Constitution. Relying on the criteria established in Chapter Three, Chapter Five assesses the 
constitution-making body and its auxiliary institutions. In addition, it provides a rigorous 
examination of the processes that culminated in the creation of the current constitution.  
Chapter Six concludes the thesis by restating major findings and offering some 
recommendations. 
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Chapter Two:  Historical background: Constitution-making in 
Zimbabwe from colonial annexation to independence (1889 to 1979) 
1. Introduction 
The making of constitutions in Zimbabwe has a long history. Prior to independence, the 
country saw not less than ten attempts at creating a new constitution. Some failed but many 
succeeded in creating a new constitution. Yet, a number of them were short-lived.  
Chapter Two assesses constitution-making in Zimbabwe from a historical perspective. For 
reasons that will become clear later, the focus of this Chapter is on the creation of the 
successive colonial constitutions, i.e. the constitutions that were adopted before independence 
in 1980. Chapter Two, thus, focuses on the period between 1889 and 1979 which was 
characterised by colonial rule. It specifically focuses on the institutions and processes that 
were used to make successive constitutions. 
What emerges from the discussion is that the history of constitution-making in Southern 
Rhodesia was driven by the desire to entrench colonial rule and facilitate white hegemony. 
Britain continued to dominate the history of constitutional development in Southern Rhodesia 
(now Zimbabwe) well after the unilateral declaration of independence.1 As the colonial 
power, Britain had the last word on the acceptability of a model constitution for Southern 
Rhodesia. It also determined the nature of the institutions and processes that were used to 
create the successive constitutions.  
2. The 1889 constitutional process 
The history of constitutional development in Southern Rhodesia can be traced back to 1888 
when King Lobengula granted Cecil John Rhodes, a South African based politician and 
businessman of English descent, exclusive mining rights through the Rudd Concession.2 It 
                                                          
1 Mangwiro 2004: 3. Zimbabwe assumed its current name in terms of section 1 (1) of the Southern Rhodesia Act 
passed by Her Majesty’s parliament on 14 November 1979. Prior to that, it was known by several names: 
Southern Rhodesia, Rhodesia, and Rhodesia-Zimbabwe. In this thesis, for purposes of convenience, the 
designation Southern Rhodesia is used in respect of the period under colonial rule (from 1888 to 1979) and 
Zimbabwe is used for the period spanning from 18 April 1980 to the present. See also Palley 1966: 29; 
Chimbwa 2012: 3. 
2 Ndulo 2010: 176. Cecil John Rhodes was a British mining magnate who had the vision of expanding British 
rule from Cape Town to Cairo. Cecil John Rhodes died on 2 March 1902 in Cape Town, South Africa and is 
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was Charles Rudd, James Maguire and Francis Thompson, three emissaries acting on behalf 
of Cecil John Rhodes, who secured, through deceit, a written concession for exclusive mining 
rights in Mashonaland and Matabeleland on 30 October 1888.3 The concession conferred on 
the grantees the sole right to extract minerals throughout Southern Rhodesia as well as the 
power to defend this exclusive mining right by force, in return for weapons and a monthly 
stipend of £100.4  
Following the grant, Cecil John Rhodes and a consortium of business people agreed to pool 
resources. In March 1889, Rhodes travelled to London where he shared with government 
officials his plans for an amalgamated charter bid involving two companies, namely the 
Central Search Association and the Exploring Company Limited. The two companies would 
be amalgamated into a company to be known as the British South Africa Company 
(BSACo). His proposal received support from the government and, on 29 October 1889, the 
then British Prime Minister Lord Salisbury (Robert Gascoyne-Cecil) granted the BSACo the 
right to operate in Southern Rhodesia.5   
The approval of the grant came in the form of a Royal Charter, a document that allocated 
notable administrative powers of governance nature to the BSACo. Clause 3 of the Royal 
Charter granted the BSACo the right to obtain powers necessary for the preservation of 
public order in territories that fall under its concessions.6 More specifically, it granted the 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
buried at Matopos Hills, Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), a country named after him. See also Chadwa 2010: 3; 
Mutandwa 2010: 19. 
3 Palley 1966: 29. King Lobengula was a King of the Ndebele people who claimed sovereignty over the entire 
territory of Zimbabwe. Cecil John Rhodes’s emissaries lied to King Lobengula about the full extent of the 
agreement the King signed. The King, who was illiterate, only found out what the agreement entailed when 
someone translated the document from English to Ndebele (the language spoken by the King). Realising that he 
had been misled, the King dispatched two emissaries to go and meet Queen Victoria in Britain in 1889. 
Although the misrepresentations were brought to the attention of the Queen, the agreement was not set aside. 
Shortly after the meeting, Cecil John Rhodes, with the assistance of mercenaries from South Africa invaded 
Southern Rhodesia in 1890. The King was defeated in the battle that ensued. The cause of the King’s death is 
not clear up to this day. Some authors, including Dickson Mungazi (1992: 8) argue that King Lobengula was 
killed by Cecil John Rhodes’s men during the invasion. Others, however, attribute the King’s death to smallpox. 
See also Matshazi 2012: 2. 
4 Mungazi 1992: 9. See also Woolridge 1939: 1; Olsson 2011: 14. 
5 Palley 1966: 30. 
6 Palley 1966: 95. See also Chatora 2009: 2. 
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BSACo the right to maintain public order by establishing and maintaining a police force. In 
addition, the Royal Charter allowed the BSACo to enter into business agreements including 
the right to form banks and to own, manage, grant or distribute land. In exchange for these 
extensive powers, the Charter obliged the BSACo to use its resources to develop the annexed 
territory and to facilitate free trade within the territory. In addition, the Charter enjoined the 
BSACo to respect existing African laws and all religions.7 Importantly, the Charter provided 
for a legislative body called the Legislative Council whose main function was to assist the 
Company to run the country by enacting laws.8  
The Royal Charter had a limited lifespan of twenty-five years. Following its expiry in 1914, 
the colonial power had two choices. It could either extend the validity of the Royal Charter or 
put in place a new constitutional arrangement. Two issues dominated the debate on the fate of 
the Charter. On the one hand, the colonial power was reluctant to put in place a constitutional 
arrangement that would make it assume full responsibility for Southern Rhodesia. The 
colonial power was happy with the status quo as long as the BSACo continued to use its 
financial resources to fund governance activities in Southern Rhodesia.9 It did not wish to 
take full responsibility as doing so meant that taxes collected from British citizens would end 
up being used to run Southern Rhodesia. There was a fear that such a decision would trigger a 
backlash from tax weary British citizens.10  
At the same time, the colonial power had to consider the capacity of the BSACo to 
competently govern Southern Rhodesia. In 1914, the colonial power authorised the setting up 
of a Legislative Assembly for Southern Rhodesia. Although the directive from the colonial 
power was for the Company to ensure that all members of the white community voted, the 
                                                          
7 Olsson 2011: 14. See also Martin & Johnson 1981: 46: Oldfield Z, 1934: 3. 
8 Between 1898 and 1922, the Legislative Council assisted the Company to run Southern Rhodesia by making 
laws. Composed of nine members, of whom five were appointed by the Company and four elected by registered 
voters, members of the Legislative Council held office for three years. Although they could be dismissed by the 
Company, they were eligible for re-election. Those nominated by the Company took precedence over those 
elected by ordinary citizens. The deliberations of the Legislative Council were chaired by an Administrator who 
was an appointee of the colonial power. The appointee, also known as the BSACo administrator, was 
responsible for implementing policy. The administrator was accountable to the Company and to the British High 
Commissioner for Southern Africa. In turn, the British High Commissioner for Southern Africa was accountable 
to the Office of Colonies in London. See also Murray 1970: 1. 
9 Chirevo 2010: 3. See also Chinhange 2013: 5. 
10 Oldfield Z, 1934: 4. 
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Company did not implement the directive fearing that it would undermine its influence. 
Instead, it facilitated the creation of a Legislative Council in which it appointed three quarters 
of legislative members. The remainder comprised members elected by the members of the 
white community that had shares in the Company.11 As the number of whites in Southern 
Rhodesia increased, so did conflict between the BSACo and members of the white 
community without shares in the Company that demanded voting rights. Demands for more 
voting rights clashed with the priorities of the BSACo, which was to administer the country 
on a profit basis so that dividends could be paid to shareholders. 
Keen to control the Legislative Council, members of the white community argued that the 
colonial power needed to link the issue of the renewal of the Royal Charter to the BSACo’s 
commitment to extend, unconditionally, voting rights to all whites. To avoid making a 
decision with financial implications, the colonial power pressured the BSACo to extend 
voting rights to all whites. Once the BSACo agreed, the colonial power renewed the period of 
validity of the Royal Charter from 1914 to 1922.12 
There is often a debate around the nature and status of the Royal Charter. At the centre of the 
debate is whether the Royal Charter can be regarded as a constitution. The general consensus 
is that the Charter ought to be regarded as Zimbabwe’s first written, albeit colonial, 
constitution. This is because it included some of the defining characteristics of a 
contemporary constitution. In the same way as the modern day constitution, the Charter was 
the supreme law of Southern Rhodesia. It provided the legal foundation for the existence of 
the country. It defined the nature of the power that the BSAC could exercise. Through it, the 
BSAC could establish governmental institutions usually provided for in modern day 
constitutions like those for the maintenance of law and order.13 It was, in short, a document of 
fundamental principles around which the country was organised. The Charter was a 
document that had the status and significance that resembled that of a modern day 
constitution. 
For purposes of this study, very little need be said about the institutional arrangements that 
accompanied the creation of Zimbabwe’s first constitution. Put simply, it was a document 
                                                          
11 Bowman 1973: 7. See also Murray 1970: 1. 
12 O’Meara 1975: 6. See also Goredema S, 2005: 3. 
13 Chigayo 2012: 1. See also O’Meara 1975: 6. 
 
 
 
 
15 
 
that came in the form of a grant. The fact that it was ‘granted’ is not surprising as that 
epitomised the manner in which colonial powers produced constitutions for colonies under 
their ‘protection’.14 Like many other documents of the time in colonial Africa, the Royal 
Charter was a document that was created to ‘advance colonial interests more than the 
interests of the people for whom they were created’.15  
3. The 1923 constitutional process 
Following the expiry of the Royal Charter in 1922, the colonial power, Britain, organised a 
referendum which gave members of the white community an opportunity to state whether 
they wish to join the Union of South Africa as its sixth province or become a semi-
autonomous colony of Britain. 59% voted to become a colony of Britain while 41% voted for 
incorporation into the Union of South Africa. Based on the results of the referendum, Britain 
decided not to renew the Royal Charter, thereby ending the administration of Southern 
Rhodesia by the BSACo under the Royal Charter and the protection of Britain. The territory 
was formally annexed by Britain by virtue of the Southern Rhodesia (Annexation) Order in 
Council which came into operation on 12 September 1923.16 Southern Rhodesia was 
integrated into the British Empire and accorded the status of a self-governing colony under 
the protection of Britain.  
In the wake of the annexation, Britain proceeded to produce a constitution for its semi-
autonomous colony. At the centre of the process of the creation of the constitution was the 
Office of Colonial Affairs, a government department mandated to manage colonies under 
British protection. As was the case with constitutions created by the Colonial Office in other 
parts of the British Empire, colonial preferences dominated the process. In fact, there is very 
little to talk about by way of a process of constitution-making. It commenced with the Office 
of Colonial Affairs appointing its officers as legal drafters, a practice that was common at the 
time. The officers drafted the constitution guided by colonial preferences. Once a draft was 
finalised and accepted by the Office of the Colonial Affairs, it was submitted to the two 
Houses of the British Legislature and approved as an Act of the British Parliament.17 It was 
                                                          
14 Mavare 2013:2. See also Musgrave 1930: 2; Brown 1980: 7. 
15 Chikoya 2013: 4. 
16 Marsh 1974: 183. See also Phimister 1984: 280; Sprack 1974: 3. 
17 Chitande 2011: 3. See also Vosloo 1974: 25. 
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then granted royal assent before it was unveiled to Southern Rhodesia on 1 September 1923 
as the Constitution of Southern Rhodesia.18 
The Constitution of 1923 provided for a Legislative Assembly.19 Based on the constitution, 
the colonial power arranged legislative elections in which only members of the white 
community participated. Blacks did not participate in the elections as they did not meet the 
requirements for voting rights, which stipulated that one needed to earn a yearly salary of 
£100 and own property worth £150.20  Those elected to parliament were sworn in on 30 May 
1924, marking the opening of the First Session of the First Parliament of Southern Rhodesia. 
At their first parliamentary session, legislators elected Sir Charles Coghlan as Prime Minister. 
The Constitution of 1923 served Southern Rhodesia for thirty-eight years. Under it, nine 
parliaments were elected before it was replaced by the Federal Constitution of 1953. 
The Constitution of 1923 was welcomed by whites as a significant step in the constitutional 
development of the colony. This is because it confirmed the position of the colony as a self-
governing territory under the protection of Britain. It was popular among the majority of 
                                                          
18 Murray 1970: 6. Murray points out that the Constitution introduced in 1923 provided only an outline 
framework. He contends that the working system that existed in Southern Rhodesia was guided by traditions and 
conventions as well as the Letters Patent and Royal Instructions to the Governor. According to the two 
documents, the government in Southern Rhodesia was subordinate to that in Britain. The Letters Patent was a 
document that provided for a system of responsible government. The Royal Instructions to the Governor was a 
document that provided for a Governor as the authorised agent of the Royal Crown in the colony. In creating the 
Constitution of 1923, the colonial power reserved for itself certain functions, the most important of which was 
the right to veto discriminatory legislation that adversely affected the interests of blacks or ran counter to the 
colonial power's international obligations. It also reserved for itself significant powers to take constitutional 
decisions without the approval of the colony’s legislature. See also Halkett 2002b: 3. 
19 The Legislative Assembly had 30 seats until the enactment of the 1961 Constitution, when it was increased to 
65 (50 constituencies and 15 districts). It was presided over by a Speaker who was an ex officio member of the 
Legislative Assembly. See North 2013: 5; Chibaya 2012: 3. 
20 O’Meara 1975: 8. Other requirements were that eligible voters needed to be aged 21 years and above, and be 
British subjects. To be eligible one also needed to be able to write one’s own name and address, sign one’s name 
on the voter registration forms as well as being able to write at dictation 50 words in the English language (if 
required to do so by the authorities). However, if a person owned a registered mining claim in Southern 
Rhodesia, such person became automatically eligible to vote. See also Palley 1966: 217. 
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whites of English descent who did not wish to see the country become a sixth province of 
South Africa. It also introduced the concept of responsible government.21   
In so far as the making of the 1923 constitution is concerned, it is clear that the process that 
led to its creation was as uninspiring as its predecessor. The fact that the Office of Colonial 
Affairs was responsible for drafting the constitution indicates that colonial priorities 
overshadowed the ‘need for participatory constitution-making’.22 Although this undermined 
the credibility of the constitution in the eyes of the majority of the population, it was not 
unusual as more emphasis, at the time, tended to be placed on the hegemonic interests of the 
colonial power. In the absence of the involvement of the local population in the making of the 
constitution at any stage of the process, the Constitution of 1923 can be described as British 
legislation called by another name.23 
 
                                                          
21 Weyer 2011: 1. Responsible government was a concept that referred to many fundamentals of good 
governance in Southern Rhodesia. Those who used the term advocated a situation in which legislators were 
elected as opposed to a situation prevailing at the time in which legislators were appointed by the BSACo. It 
was argued that Southern Rhodesia should be ruled through democratically elected representatives rather than 
Company imposed representatives. The number of democratically elected legislators, it was contended, needed 
to be more than the number of appointed representatives. It also embodied the idea that the Executive and 
Government of the day is accountable to an elected Parliament. Individual ministers of government, it was 
argued, are responsible and accountable to Parliament for their official actions and for the administration of the 
departments of State under their control. The Executive and Government, it was pointed out, should resign in 
the event that the majority of elected parliamentarians pass a vote of no confidence. Should that happen, the 
Executive must either resign or dissolve Parliament and call a general election. This is called the collective 
responsibility of government. These features require that the ministers who compose government must be 
members of the legislature. An advantage of this is that a minister who is criticised has the right to reply. Also 
included in the phrase ‘responsible government’ was the idea that all major national decisions need to be ratified 
by citizens before implementation. The phrase was also used to describe a situation in which citizens of 
Southern Rhodesia continued to govern themselves under the protection of the British Empire as opposed to 
incorporation into the Union of South Africa. The campaign for responsible government was spearheaded by a 
political party named the Responsible Government League (Association). Credited with the rejection of the idea 
of incorporating Southern Rhodesia into the Union of South Africa, the party changed its name to the Rhodesian 
Party in 1923. See also Good 1973: 32; Read 1959: 136. 
22 Zhanje 2012: 3. See also Chikoya 2013: 4; Stone 1935: 3. 
23 Chibaya 2012: 2. 
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4. The 1953 constitutional process 
A few years after the installation of the Constitution of 1923, some influential authorities in 
Southern Rhodesia and Britain mooted the idea of establishing a political order that brings 
together Southern Rhodesia, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, all colonies of Britain at the 
time. Under this plan, it was envisaged that the three colonies could enter into a federal 
partnership that is based on the territorial distribution of power and the principle of shared 
sovereignty.24  
The federal idea was initially mooted as far back as 1922. Initially the suggestion was to link 
up Southern and Northern Rhodesia. However, the idea was turned down by whites in 
Southern Rhodesia who thought that the union was to be at their expense. The issue of a 
union between the three colonies came up again in 1938 with the colonial power, Britain, 
setting up a Royal Commission under Lord Bledisloe. The Commission was tasked with 
consulting people in the three colonies on the desirability and acceptability of a union. In its 
findings, the Bledisloe Commission found that a closer association was desirable. In 1948, Sir 
Roy Welensky and Sir Godfrey Huggins, two influential politicians from Northern and 
Southern Rhodesia, convened a meeting to discuss the Federation at the resort town of 
Victoria Falls.25 It was that meeting that paved the way for the formation of the Federation of 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland on 1 August 1953.26  
The federation was established to bring together three countries into a closer association that 
would facilitate economic development. It was envisaged that the alliance would bring 
together cheap labour from Nyasaland for the expansion of the agricultural and industrial 
sector in Southern Rhodesia, minerals from Northern Rhodesia and capital and technical 
skills from Southern Rhodesia to grow the integrated economy. Moreover, it was argued that 
a single economic system would attract more investment for the federation than each of the 
three small countries was able to realise on its own.  Associated with this was the argument 
that the federation would make it easy to co-ordinate the provision of basic infrastructure that 
is key for meeting socio-economic development such as health and educational facilities.27 In 
particular, the federation, it was argued, would promote development by widening the local 
                                                          
24 Brown 1980: 7. See also King 2009: 48; North 2013: 4. 
25 Brown 1980: 7. Nyasaland was not represented at the meeting. See also Mhuka 2012: 3. 
26 Reynolds 2012: 6. See also Bwanusi 1953: 1; Hance 1954: 13. 
27 Keatley 1963: 392. See also Sprack 1974: 14. 
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market, diversifying the regional economy, facilitating more efficient use of regional 
resources and making the region more attractive to foreign investors. It was also hoped that 
by joining territories together, racial partnership would be fostered. Finally, the British 
Government argued that a federation would made it easy for the political union to obtain full 
membership of the British Commonwealth, after which the federal state would be granted 
independence as a dominion.  
The translation of the federal idea into an institutional reality came through the creation of a 
federal constitution by the so-called Constitutional Commission, which was held in London 
in 1953. The Constitutional Commission was comprised of members representing the 
colonial power, Britain, and representatives of the three colonies. In total, forty-one delegates 
attended the Constitutional Commission.28 Thirteen delegates led by Oliver Lyttelton, 
Secretary of State for Colonial Affairs, represented the colonial power.29 Thirteen delegates 
led by Sir Godfrey Huggins (later Lord Malvern), long time Prime Minister of Southern 
Rhodesia, represented the people of Southern Rhodesia. Northern Rhodesia had eight 
delegates led by its territorial Governor, Sir Gilbert Rennie. Six delegates led Sir Geoffrey 
Colby, Governor of Nyasaland, represented the people of Nyasaland. Of the forty-one 
delegates, only two delegates from Southern Rhodesia were black (these were Joshua Nkomo 
and Jasper Savanhu). Black delegates from Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland declined to 
attend the Constitutional Commission in any capacity even though they remained in London 
during the conference and carried out significant discussions with a wide range of people.30 
The Constitutional Commission was chaired by Oliver Lyttelton. The Constitutional 
Commission, with the assistance of Professor Kenneth Clinton Wheare, a renowned 
international expert on federalism, commenced the task of negotiating the provisions of the 
Constitution. The negotiations were carried out in plenary sessions. It was characterised by 
acrimony. The representatives of the black community demanded nothing short of majority 
rule as well as full and equal rights.  The demand was ignored. Not much effort was made to 
address the demands of the representatives of the black community that were opposed to the 
                                                          
28 Campbell 2012: 5. See also Government of Britain 1952: 23; Palley 1966: 335. 
29 Chimbwa 2012: 2. See also Mangwiro 2004: 5. 
30 Palley 1966: 339. Support staff comprised eight people of whom three were legal advisers, one conference 
adviser, and four secretaries. See also Fraser 1968: 3; Parliament of Britain 1953: 11. 
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federation.31 The white delegates from the three colonies were determined to establish a 
constitution that facilitated a union that entrenched white interests. Although the colonial 
power ruled out amalgamation without the consent of blacks in the three territories, it 
accepted the principle of federation.  
After extensive deliberation, an agreement was reached to divide responsibilities between the 
federal government and the constituent units. The federal government was made responsible 
for matters like foreign affairs, defence, extradition, citizenship of the federation, customs 
and excise, exchange control and promissory notes, copyright, patents and designs, audit of 
federal public accounts, federal public service, meteorology, supply of electricity, 
communication infrastructure and immigration. Both levels of government were empowered 
to pass legislation on matters concerning deportation, movements of persons from one 
territory to another, banks and banking, distribution of electricity, regulation of road traffic, 
prisons, health, geological, trigonometrical, typographical and cadastral surveys, census and 
statistics. These formed part of what was called the concurrent list. Matters not listed under 
the exclusive and concurrent lists were regarded as residual matters that belong to the units.32 
In cases of inconsistency between federal law and the laws of the component units, federal 
law prevailed.  
Following agreement on the content of the Federal Constitution, a draft constitution was 
produced by officials from the Colonial Office. This was submitted to the British Parliament 
on 19 July 1953. The legislative proceedings began with Oliver Lyttelton moving a motion 
requesting British legislators to go through the provisions of the document, which was 
divided into two parts. The first part consisted of 15 sections containing all those measures 
necessary to set up the Federation and to enable it to begin its work in the interim period. The 
second part consisted of 99 Articles and two Schedules which formed the provisions of the 
Federal Constitution. The legislators spent a considerable amount of time discussing the issue 
of concurrent and exclusive powers within the federal arrangement. In addition, the 
legislators spent a great deal of time discussing the question of how an effective and efficient 
system of federal government would operate and fit in with the colonial power’s governance 
                                                          
31 Chimbwa 2012: 3. See also Bowman 1973: 18. 
32 King 2009: 49. See also Brown 1980: 7; Somerville 1963: 390. 
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structures. It was agreed that there would be five different government departments with 
overlapping and interlocking responsibilities for the federal government.33 
Before the draft Constitution was presented to both Houses of the Parliament of Britain for 
final approval, it was submitted on 9 April 1953, in terms of the Federation Poll Act, for a 
referendum in Southern Rhodesia in which only members of the white community 
participated. It was approved by 63.45%. The draft constitution was not, however, submitted 
for a referendum in Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland.34 The draft Constitution was instead 
submitted to the Legislative Councils of the two colonies. Both passed resolutions in favour 
of adopting the federal constitution. Shortly afterwards, the Federal Constitution was 
presented to Queen Elizabeth for her assent, which was granted. The Constitution was 
enacted as the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Constitution) Order in Council 1953, 
Statutory Instrument 1953, No. 1199.35 The enactment took place on 1 August 1953. The 
Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland came into existence on 3 September 1953 and the 
Federal Constitution came into full operation on 23 October 1953.  
The federation was in force for ten years during which time it was characterised by acrimony 
that ultimately led to its demise. The unwillingness of whites in Southern Rhodesia to take 
practical steps to eradicate the policy of racism when the other two territories were committed 
to multi-racial coexistence, brought the alliance at loggerheads. Blacks in the three territories 
resented the fact that the entitlement to vote continued to operate on a racial basis when the 
federation was built on the concept of multi-racial partnership. In this regard, one author 
accused whites in Southern Rhodesia of following a ‘civilisation policy on paper and 
reducing it to a farce in practice’.36 The statement by Sir Geoffrey Huggins, Prime Minister 
of the Federation, describing the relationship between blacks and whites as a ‘partnership of 
the black (horse) and white (rider)’ was seen as proof that whites were not committed to the 
success of the federation.37 Moreover, an increase in nationalist activities in all three 
territories tipped the federation towards the precipice. It was with these issues hanging over 
the head of the federation that it practically stopped functioning in 1957 with the concurrence 
                                                          
33 Weyer 2011: 2. See also Chimbwa 2012: 3. 
34 Unlike Southern Rhodesia, which was a self-governing colony, the two colonies were ruled directly from 
London. See Chaputa 2009: 3. 
35 Palley 1966: 343. 
36 Walker E, 1953: 94. See also King 2009: 51; Wood 1969: 6. 
37 Gwangwava 2013: 4. 
 
 
 
 
22 
 
of the colonial power, Britain. Following the distribution of the assets of the federation 
among the alliance members, Britain granted independence to Nyasaland (as Malawi) and 
Northern Rhodesia (as Zambia).38  
In so far as the constitution making process is concerned, the Constitutional Commission 
could be commended for including black representatives who were previously excluded from 
negotiating earlier constitutions. The inclusion of blacks might suggest that the authorities 
made an effort to make the institution of constitution-making broad based. However, the 
endeavour was inadequate. White and black delegates were not equal in number.  Neither did 
the composition reflect the proportion of whites to blacks. As one author wrote, ‘[t]he 
inclusion of blacks was symbolic. It was meant to camouflage white domination of the 
constitution-making’.39 In addition, representatives of vulnerable groups were excluded, 
including Asians. Women were also not represented.  
It is clear that the process leading to the creation of the federal constitution left a lot to be 
desired.  The constitution was forced onto the ordinary citizens without consideration of their 
wishes. It was a document that ‘was imposed despite the outcry of natives, namely blacks in 
the three countries who constituted the majority’.40 As one author argues, the events leading 
up to the creation of the Federal Constitution ‘were nothing but well calculated moves to give 
legal status to a set-up that entrenched the interests of whites’.41 
Generally speaking, local involvement in the making of the federal constitution was glaringly 
absent. Except in the case of Southern Rhodesia, the Federal Constitution was not submitted 
to approval through referendum. Even in the case of Southern Rhodesia, it was only members 
of the white community that were allowed to participate in the referendum. What we saw was 
approval through the British Parliament. In fact, the Federal Constitution was passed as a 
parliamentary Act of Britain with Queen Elizabeth’s consent.42  
 
                                                          
38 O’Meara 1975: 26.  See also McDougal & Reisman 1968: 2. 
39 Oliver 2010: 3. See also Goredema V, 2013:3; North 2013: 5. 
40 Chitande 2011: 6. 
41 Chisora 2011: 5. See also Howard 1970: 3; Rooney 1967: 4. 
42 Howard 1970: 3. See also Mhuka 2012: 3. 
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5. The constitutional conference of 1961 
As mentioned earlier, the federation was a short-lived political union. It collapsed in 1957. 
This prompted the search for a new constitution in Southern Rhodesia. The search for the 
new constitution was also triggered by political developments that engulfed African states in 
the 1960s.  
The 1960s was a period of decolonisation in Africa. Five British colonies in Africa, (i.e 
Ghana (1957), Somalia/Nigeria (1960), Uganda (1962), and Kenya (1963)) marched to 
independence based on universal adult suffrage. As Harold MacMillan, the then British Prime 
Minister, stated, ‘the winds of change were blowing across Africa’.43 The colonial authorities 
of Southern Rhodesia sought to enact a new constitution as part of the larger effort to address 
the question of racial tension between blacks and whites. This led to the creation of a 
Constitutional Conference in January 1961. 
The Constitutional Conference was tasked with negotiating a new constitution. It was 
composed of delegates drawn from four political parties, namely the United Federal Party, 
the Dominion Party, the National Democratic Party and the Central Africa Party. The 
Conference was also attended by representatives of the Coloured and Asian communities. 
The United Federal Party (UFP) was the ruling party led by Prime Minister Edgar Whitehead. 
The UFP sought a constitution that would ‘secure full independence from Britain by 
removing the reserved powers which Britain had retained in the 1923 Constitution’s granting 
of limited self-government for Southern Rhodesia’.44 The Dominion Party (DP) was the 
official opposition party in Parliament. Led by William Harper, the DP stood for a much 
more racist political system and was unwilling to make concessions to members of the black 
community. The National Democratic Party (NDP), led by Joshua Nkomo, was a political 
party that claimed to represent the interests of the black community. It pushed for a 
constitution that respected the principle of ‘one man, one vote’, outlined in its document titled 
‘The African Case’.45 It was not represented in parliament. The Central Africa Party (CAP) 
was a multi-racial liberal party that sought to create a constitution based on liberal values and 
                                                          
43 Turpin 1967: 126. Prime Minister Harold Wilson made the historic statement about the winds of change 
blowing across Africa on 3 February 1960 when he addressed the Parliament of South Africa in Cape Town. See 
also Olsson 2011: 17; O’Meara 1975: 14. 
44 Olsson 2011: 17. See also Day 1978: 223; Bowman 1973: 35. 
45 Olsson 2011: 17. 
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non-racial standards. The colonial power, Britain, was not represented at the Constitutional 
Conference.46 
Chaired by Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead, the Constitutional Conference commenced 
its deliberations in Salisbury (Harare) in January 1961. The objective of the Constitutional 
Conference, according to the Prime Minister, was the creation of a constitution that would be 
satisfactory for blacks, whites and the colonial power, Britain. Delegates were informed that 
the principles of consensus and co-operation would define the framework for negotiating the 
constitution. Delegates were also informed that issues which the political parties did not agree 
on would be referred to the Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys, who was tasked to 
come up with a final position on these matters. Accordingly, easier issues were left to the 
Constitutional Conference while the Commonwealth Secretary was mandated ‘to take up and 
find a solution to’ contentious issues.47 
Five contentious areas were identified and referred to Duncan Sandys for determination. The 
first issue was whether the Constitution should have a Declaration of Rights or a Bill of 
Rights.48 It was determined that a Declaration of Rights should be enshrined in the 
Constitution. According to Duncan Sandys, the fundamental rights and freedoms were to 
apply to all without distinction of race, colour or creed. The only exception, however, was an 
                                                          
46 North 2013: 5 See also Wall 1960: 3. 
47 Zivo 2013: 3. See also Olsson 2011: 25; Brown 1980: 7. 
48 Ndulo 2010: 178. Although often regarded as the same, it is sometimes argued that there is a difference 
between a Bill of Rights and a Declaration of Rights. A Bill of Rights is a human rights charter that protects 
the civil, political and socio-economic rights of all people. For example in South Africa, Chapter 2 of the 
Constitution of 1996 contains the Bill of Rights. The rights in the Bill apply to all law, including the common 
law, and bind all branches of the government, including the national executive, parliament, the judiciary, 
provincial governments and municipal councils. Some provisions, such as those prohibiting unfair 
discrimination, also apply to the actions of private persons. On the other hand, a Declaration of Rights, while it 
focuses on human rights, tends to have a narrower scope when compared to a Bill of Rights. The phrase 
‘Declaration of Rights’ is widely associated with the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, a 
document adopted by the French National Assembly in 1789 and used as a preface to the French Constitution of 
1791. One of the basic charters of human liberties, it served as the preamble to the Constitution of 1791. Its 
basic principle was that ‘all men are born free and equal in rights,’ specified as the rights of liberty, private 
property, the inviolability of the person, and resistance to oppression. It also established the principle of equality 
before the law and the freedoms of religion and speech. The Declaration represented a repudiation of the pre-
Revolutionary monarchical regime. See also Olsson 2011: 25. 
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emergency when the State needed to deal with urgent issues relating to defence and public 
safety, maintenance of law and order and public health and morality. The second area that the 
political parties sought intervention on was the question of what to do with prevailing 
discriminatory legislation. Sandys’s position was that a Constitutional Council of 12 
members be set up to consider every Bill submitted to the Legislative Assembly for 
discrimination and that if the Constitutional Council considers that any provision of the Bill 
would be inconsistent with the Declaration of Rights, it should submit to government an 
adverse report. Aggrieved individuals could apply to the Appellate Division of the High 
Court for redress. 
The third contentious issue, representation in the legislature and franchise, was the most 
controversial. It almost led to the breakdown of the Constitutional Conference. The political 
parties’ presented diverse positions on this issue. The UFP acknowledged the need to increase 
the number of blacks in parliament but stressed the importance of not lowering the 
qualifications for voting. The DP did not wish to see blacks represented in parliament and 
advised that they be denied any entitlement to the ballot. The CAP wanted to see literacy in 
English as the primary condition that determined whether or not voting rights were extended 
to blacks. The NDP insisted on one man-one vote for all citizens without prior conditions. 
The coloured community insisted on two seats reserved for them in parliament. Finally, the 
Asian community insisted on being allocated one seat in parliament.49  
Sandys determined that the size of parliament be increased from 30 to 65 members in order to 
accommodate more black representatives.50 15 seats in the parliament were reserved for 
members of the black community. The threshold of income as well as the value of property 
one needed to own in order to be enrolled on the voters roll was reduced to accommodate 
members of the black community.  
The fourth issue pertained to the procedures of amending the proposed constitution. In this 
regard, it was agreed that basic clauses in the Constitution could not be altered without 
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consent or referendum of the four principal races (blacks, whites, coloureds and Asians) 
voting separately or by consent of the British Government.51 
Following the resolution of the contentious issues, a document was submitted to the colonial 
authorities. It contained all the issues that the political parties agreed should form the content 
of the impending constitution. Shortly afterwards, the British government prepared and 
published two ‘white papers’ in Salisbury and London on the constitution. The first paper 
summarised the changes to the constitution. The second paper summarised the contents of the 
constitution. Thereafter, the draft was submitted to the Legislative Assembly of Southern 
Rhodesia and adopted as the Constitution of 1961.52  
On 26 July 1961, the Constitution was put to a referendum. The question submitted to 
members of the white community was whether or not they approve the Constitution of 1961 
as adopted by the Legislative Assembly.  The UFP of Prime Minister Sir Edgar Whitehead 
encouraged its supporters to endorse the Constitution. The groups that urged a ‘No vote’ 
included Ian Smith’s United Group and the Rhodesian Vigilance Association.53 They 
encouraged the ‘No vote’ because they were not happy about the 15 seats reserved for blacks 
under the voters’ roll for blacks (B-roll). 65.79% (of the 64 402 who participated) approved 
the Constitution, while 34.21% rejected it. Based on this, the Constitution was forwarded to 
the two Houses of the British Parliament and it was enacted as the Southern Rhodesia 
(Constitution) Act (1961).54  
                                                          
51 Olsson 2011: 25. The final issue referred to the status of the reserve powers which allowed Britain to withhold 
consent to Bills and to annul Acts already passed by the Legislative Assembly. Sandys advised that the 
Constitutional Council and the possibility to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (in Britain) 
over matters of discriminatory legislation provided sufficient safeguards for Britain to relinquish its reserve 
powers. Following the resolution of contentious issues, the colonial power reduced its powers to revoke or 
amend the colony’s constitution. It confined its powers to amend the constitution to one of the two alternative 
procedures prescribed for constitutional amendment. The intervention of the British Government was limited to 
measures deemed inconsistent with the colonial power’s international obligations. The British Government 
stripped itself of the general power to legislate on matters within the competence of the government of Southern 
Rhodesia. See also Goredema S, 2005: 3. 
52 Reynolds 2012: 6. See also Olsson 2011: 26; Chitate 2011: 5. 
53 Bowman 1973: 40. 
54 Ndulo 2010: 178. See also Flower 1987: 39. 
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From the foregoing, one of the issues that need closer examination is the composition of the 
Constitutional Conference. Of particular importance is the extent to which previously 
marginalised segments of society were represented in the Constitutional Conference. The 
inclusion of a political party representing blacks and representatives of other minority groups 
represents a departure from the past where members of the latter groups were totally excluded 
from the previous constitution-making processes. It is, however, very difficult to agree that 
the Conference was fully inclusive. The Conference, for example, did not include all political 
parties.55 The methods by which the members of the Constitutional Conference were selected 
were also questionable. The government cherry picked delegates to the Constitutional 
Conference.56 The exclusion of groups such as those representing members of the Jewish 
community and foreign nationals resident in the country, it has been argued, ‘painted a 
picture of a constitution-making process that was not the least informed by the basic norms of 
inclusion’.57 
The process leading to the adoption of the Constitution was also problematic. Normal voting 
requirements were, for example, used in the referendum, resulting in the exclusion of 
members of the black community.58 The net effect of this decision was that members of the 
white community are the only ones that voted in the referendum. This was despite the fact 
that they constituted the demographic minority. The exclusion of members of the black 
community undermined the legitimacy of the referendum and its outcome. That is why the 
assertion that the Constitution received overwhelming support has ‘to be taken with a pinch 
of salt’.59   
                                                          
55 Brown 1980: 6. The African National Congress (Southern Rhodesia), was for example, not represented at the 
Constitutional Conference. Two of its leaders, James Chikerema and George Nyandoro were at the time being 
held in detention by the government as part of a wider crackdown on nationalists. Described by many as 
‘pioneers of the modern nationalist movement in Southern Rhodesia’, the exclusion of their political party 
served to demonstrate that the Constitutional Conference was not inclusive enough. See also Benjamin 1964: 3. 
56 The fact that Joshua Nkomo was invited while the likes of James Chikerema and George Nyandoro were not 
invited seems to suggest that cherry picking was a big consideration in deciding who was invited to attend the 
conference.   
57 Chimunhu J, 2009: 1.  
58 To be entitled to vote in the referendum, one needed to own property valued at £500 or more and earn an 
annual salary amounting to £250 or more. See Chakanyuka 2012: 4. 
59 Benjamin 1964: 3. See also Smith D, 1969: 21; Reynolds 2012: 6. 
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Generally speaking, the deliberations at the Conference were not informed by the common 
good. The squabbles that followed the declaration of the so-called contentious issues revealed 
that deliberations were rather driven by short-term political objectives. The fact that the 
political parties referred five so called contentious issues to the Commonwealth Secretary to 
decide suggests that polarisation, divisions, conflict and intolerance dominated the context in 
which the constitution-making process unfolded.60 This raises serious questions about the 
commitment of the political parties to the creation of a constitution that appealed to all 
segments of society.61  
6. Constitution-making under rebellion (1965) 
The 1961 Constitution was as short lived as the federation that preceded it. This had to do 
with the strained relationship that developed between the semi-autonomous colony of 
Southern Rhodesia and the colonial power, Britain. At the centre of the tension was the 
decision of the colonial power not to extend independence to Southern Rhodesia. Following 
the collapse of the Federation and Britain’s facilitation of black majority governments to 
assume authority in neighbouring Malawi (Nyasaland) and Zambia (Northern Rhodesia) in 
1963 and 1964, the political authorities in Salisbury raised the issue of independence for the 
self-governing colony. They requested the colonial power to unconditionally grant 
independence to Southern Rhodesia. They argued that Southern Rhodesia was a better 
candidate for independence as it had over forty years of experience in running its own affairs.   
The request was turned down by the colonial power on the ground that the self-governing 
colony did not meet the conditions for granting independence outlined in the colonial power's 
new policy of ‘no independence before majority rule’ (NIBMAR).62 Southern Rhodesia did 
                                                          
60 Mafunda 2009: 2. 
61 Bowman 1973: 37. See also Good 1973: 44; Edmunds 1965: 2. 
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